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[Vol. 10:339 covered by the Geneva Convention" and will continue to be denied Geneva law protections, supposedly because al Qaeda "cannot be considered a state party to the Geneva Convention." 4 As noted soon thereafter, however,
The White House statement demonstrates remarkable ignorance of the nature and reach of treaties and customary international law. First, any member of al Qaeda who is a national of a state that has ratified the relevant treaties is protected by them. Nearly every state, including Saudi Arabia, is a signatory to these treaties. Second, the 1949 Geneva Conventions are part of customary international law that is universally applicable in times of armed conflict and, as such, protect all human beings according to their terms. Third, common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions] provides nonderogable protections and due process guarantees for every human being who is captured and, like common Article 1, assures their application in all circumstances. 5 With respect to treaties, it was affirmed long ago by Chief Justice Jay that "every citizen is a party to them." 6 This fundamental aspect of treaty law assures that individuals and groups (such as members of al Qaeda) are bound by treaties that have been adhered to by the state of which they are nationals. It is why an array of treaties addressing international crimes such as aircraft hijacking, aircraft sabotage, hostage-taking, forced disappearance, terrorism, genocide, and war crimes are binding on various individ- 4 See Seelye, supra note 2. President Bush's memorandum stated that he accepted "the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice" "dated January 22, 2002," and determined "that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda . . . because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party." Bush Feb. 7, 2002 memorandum, supra note 1, at para. 2(a). The memorandum sent on January 22 was most likely the thirty-seven-page Memorandum for Alberto R. 11 Subsequently, the CIA disclosed the existence of a directive signed by President Bush granting the CIA power to set up secret detention facilities in foreign territory and outlining interrogation tactics that were authorized as well as another document that contains a Department of Justice legal analysis specifying interrogation methods that the CIA was authorized to use against top al 7 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 8 Id. at 2756-57. 9 Id. at 2802 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
Qaeda members.
12 There is no indication that the presidential finding or directive has been withdrawn. In fact, during a speech on September 6, 2006, President Bush admitted that a CIA program has been implemented "to move . . . [high-value] individuals to . . . where they can be held in secret" and interrogated using "tough" forms of treatment and he stated that the CIA program will continue.
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The unlawful "tough" interrogation tactics that are an admitted part of the Bush program are war crimes.
14 They are also violations of non-derogable customary and treaty-based human rights law 15 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 16 The transfer of non-prisoners-of-war out of war-related occupied territory in Afghanistan and Iraq during the Bush program was also a war crime. Such transfers are absolutely prohibited under Article 49 of the Geneva Civilian Convention and constitute "grave breaches" of the Convention. 17 Moreover, the refusal to disclose the names or the whereabouts of persons subjected to secret transfer and secret detention is a manifest and serious crime against humanity known as "forced disappearance"-a crime that also involves patent violations of related human rights law, the Convention Against Torture, and the laws of war. John Yoo, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, has admitted that "some of the worst possible interrogation methods we've heard of in the press have been reserved for the leaders of al Qaeda that we've captured" 19 and, with remarkable candor and abandonment, "I've defended the administration's legal approach to the treatment of al Qaida suspects and detainees," including the use of torture. 20 More recently, John Yoo has provided an honest, remorseless, and revealing set of admissions concerning inner-cir- cle decisions of the Bush administration to violate Geneva law. As he discloses, detention, denial of Geneva protections, and coercive interrogation "policies were part of a common, unifying approach to the war on terrorism." 21 Instead of "following the Geneva Conventions," during meetings chaired by White House Counsel Gonzales 22 the inner-circle decided whether such "would yield any benefits or act as a hindrance."
23 They knew that following Geneva law would "interfere with our ability to . , and what was not."), 172 ("OLC addressed this question: What is the meaning of 'torture' "). This is an example of manifestly and seriously unprofessional advice, leaving unstated, for example, the ban under several treaties of the United States and customary international law of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. It has led to possible criminal and civil liability here and abroad for CIA personnel and U.S. soldiers. See, e.g., supra note 18; infra note 45. 30 See id. at 172 ("harsh interrogation short of torture"), 177 ("Congress banned torture, but not interrogation techniques short of it . . . coercive interrogation" is permitted), 178 ("[m]ethods that . . . do not cause severe pain or suffering are permitted."), 187 ("American law prohibits torture but not coercive interrogation," such as "using 'excruciating pain' "), 190-91 (coercive interrogation was used), 192 ("coercive interrogation . . . should not be ruled out"), 202 (same). which includes cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 31 In view of the fact that a "common, unifying approach" was devised to use coercive interrogation tactics and President Bush has admitted that such tactics and secret detention have been used in other countries, it is obvious that coercive interrogation tactics migrated also to Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the common plan. 32 It is also clear, for example, that the Yoo-Delahunty, 33 Gonzales, 34 Ashcroft, 35 Bybee, 36 and Goldsmith 37 memos and letters, the 2003 DOD Working Group Report, 38 and presidential and other authorizations, directives, and findings substantially facilitated the effectuation of the common, unifying plan to use coercive interrogation and that use of authorized coercive interrogation tactics were either known or substantially foreseeable consequences.
Implementation of the common plan apparently occurred first at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. It is well-known that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had expressly authorized patently unlawful interrogation tactics involving the stripping of persons naked, use of dogs, and hooding, among other unlawful tactics, in an action memo on December 2, 2002 39 and in another memo on April 16, 2003, 40 the Secretary adding that if additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee were required he might approve them upon written request. 43 each of which is manifestly illegal under the laws of war and human rights law 44 and can result in criminal and civil sanctions for war crimes. 45 Are the President, the Vice President, 46 the Attorney General, and others within the executive branch above the law? Clearly they are not, despite an arrogant and fundamentally anti-democratic commander-above-the-law policy that seeks an unreviewable power to override any inhibiting domestic or international law. 47 Under the United States Constitution, the President is expressly and unavoidably bound to faithfully execute the law and has been granted no discretion to violate the law. 48 Three sets of numerous and venerable Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions confirm that the President, as Commander in Chief, is not above the law. One consistent and unswerving set of cases reflects the unanimous views of the Founders and Framers that, during war, the President and all persons within the executive branch are bound by the laws of war, whether or not those laws are based in treaties of the United States or customary international law. 49 A second set of cases provides overwhelming recognition that decisions of the Executive during war concerning the status of persons, their seizure and detention, their rights, their treatment, and the seizure of property are judicially reviewable and that the judiciary, despite provisional characterizations by the executive, will identify, clarify, and apply relevant customary and treaty-based international law. 50 A remarkable Supreme Court case that is found in the first and second set of cases is The Paquete Habana.
51 Although the case is too often needlessly misunderstood and misquoted, the Supreme Court denied a claim of the executive concerning the content of a customary law of war and ruled that executive seizures of enemy alien vessels and enemy aliens abroad in time of war in exercise of executive war powers in the theater of war were void because they were in violation of customary international law which is part of the laws of the United States that must be ascertained and applied by the judiciary. 52 constitutionally-based power to place limits on certain commander in chief powers during war, including limitations on warfare with respect to its extent, objects, operations, methods, persons and things affected, places, and time. 53 More generally, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the President's foreign relations power can "be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress . . . and [if regulated thusly, must] be executed by the executive" in accordance with the treaty or legislative limitations. 54 During war and threats to national security, it is often the judiciary that has maintained the line between lawful and unlawful exercises of power, a line that the Supreme Court has maintained more recently in Rasul, 55 Hamdi, 56 and Hamdan. 57 For example, in the face of executive claims to unreviewable commander in chief powers, the Supreme Court affirmed in Hamdi that courts can "exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims" 58 and quoted Sterling v. Constantin 59 for its earlier recognition that "'[w]hat are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.'" 60 Hamdi also affirmed that executive claims to unreviewable power or to power subject only to "a heavily circumscribed role for the courts" cannot comport with the proper separation of powers since it "serves only to condense power into a single branch of government," adding "a state of war is not a blank check for the President." 61 Finally, the President's "dirty war" tactics and autocratic policies have not only created criminal and civil liability, they have also served our enemies and degraded this country, its values, and its influence. As patriots of democratic freedom understand, they
